Introduction and background
Is the world converging to a single demographic regime? Or are groups of countries following distinct paths through the process of demographic transition? The answers to these questions are pivotal to our understanding of the nature and mechanisms of population change. They are also key elements for deriving the assumptions underlying population projections. Following an exploratory investigation by Wilson (2001) , interest in global demographic convergence has continued through the last decade. More attention has been given to mortality (Bloom and Canning 2007; Clark 2010; Goesling and Firebaugh 2004; Mayer-Foulkes 2003; McMichael et al. 2004; Moser et al. 2005; Neumayer 2004 ). The focus on mortality may arise in part because life expectancy is one component in the calculation of the widely used human development index, proposed by the United Nations, and is often used in other calculations of the quality of life (Becker et al 2005; Gidwitz et al. 2010; Kenny 2005; Konya and Guisan 2008; Mayer-Foulkes 2010; Molina 2010; Neumayer 2003) . It is also the case that studying life expectancy (an increasing variable with no logical limit) is a natural extension of economists' interest in convergence in income. Fertility change, and its implications, has also been examined through the lens of convergence, (Lee and Reher 2011; Reher 2004 Reher , 2007 Wilson 2004; and especially Dorius 2008) . However, convergence in total fertility (the main variable of interest) is potentially more difficult to interpret than life expectancy, as the TFR is a decreasing variable with a logical limit, zero, and a de facto lower limit to date of around one. Thus convergence in fertility must, of its nature, be an asymptotic process.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of much of the work on convergence is the ambiguous nature of the conclusions. In mortality it seems that convergence was modest at any time, and has been replaced by divergence since the 1980s (Moser et al. 2005) , and in fertility the only definite statistical evidence for convergence is found after 1990 (Dorius 2008 ). However, the limited degree of convergence that emerges from sophisticated analyses seems to run contrary to the more mundane evidence from simple time-trends in total fertility or life expectancy, which suggests that both the health and fertility transitions are in full swing. In this brief note my aim is to consider the implications of the studies of convergence published over the last 10 years and to sketch out a context within which I believe analysis of convergence, and the ambiguous statistical evidence for it, can best be viewed. I address mortality and fertility in turn, though some of the methodological points are relevant to both.
Rather than repeat the calculations made by the various scholars who have studied convergence, this paper takes a different slant, examining the trajectories over time that various world regions have followed. When presented in this way, the data suggest that five distinct regional histories can be traced in mortality, and three in fertility, and that global convergence has moved more rapidly and unambiguously in fertility than in mortality. In common with most analyses in the literature, here I use the comprehensive estimates of life expectancy and total fertility since 1950 made by the United Nations Population Division as part of their biennial population projections (United Nations 2009).
In answering the basic questions posed at the outset, demographers are able to draw on an extensive literature, theoretical, methodological and empirical, within economics, where convergence lies at the heart of modern economic growth theory (Barro and Sala-iMartin 1992, 2004) . The classic methods used in economics refer to two distinct but related measures: beta-and sigma-convergence. Beta convergence is said to occur when countries that are laggards in the demographic transition (i.e. with lower life expectancy or higher fertility at the start of a time period) show more movement towards convergence than those further along the process of transition. Sigma-convergence occurs if the variance of the variable under study, usually life expectancy or total fertility, diminishes over time. In addition to these core indicators, scholars have also used a wide range of other measures of dispersion to search for evidence of convergence. A potentially valuable dimension for demography is the attention given in economics to "convergence clubs", groups of countries that show common trends, even if they differ from more general patterns of convergence.
This interest in diverse experiences has led to the hunt for multiple equilibria, sometimes referred to as "twin peaks" when only two distinct distributions are expected (Quah 1996 (Quah , 1997 . The method of choice for the study of convergence in the presence of multimodality has been "kernel density estimates" proposed by Silverman (1981) . Bloom and Canning (2007) have provided an example of the potential of this method for studying health transition, though as yet no systematic study of fertility in this way has been published. In short, the researcher interested in studying convergence has no lack of statistical tools fit for the purpose.
Mortality
When considering the progress of the health transition, we see that the world is not a single demographic system. Rather, it is cut by deep faults into a number of blocs, each with its own distinctive trajectory of life expectancy. I have chosen here to divide the nations of the world into five groups: the USSR and its successor states, the rest of the developed world (i.e. the rest of Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia), Southern Africa (i.e. South Africa and its English-speaking neighbours), the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. East, Middle and West Africa) and finally, the rest of the developing world. More sub-divisions could easily be proposed, whose mortality history differs in some degree from the rest of the world. that EMW Africa will fall to the current level of the developed world in a little over 50 years.
The speed and generality of the fertility decline stand is sharp contrast to the ambiguous picture of convergence seen in mortality. Nowhere do we see departures from the general fertility trends comparable with the stagnation in life expectance in the USSR and Post-Soviet States, let alone the massive drop in life expectancy suffered by Southern Africa.
Although there have been pauses and plateaux in national TFRs, both in the historical transition in Europe and the contemporary developing country experience, none has involved the scale of divergence seen in mortality. There seems every reason to view fertility transition as a genuinely global phenomenon (Reher 2004) . In this context, it is time for demographers to pay serious attention to the issue of post-transitional fertility in developing countries; much of the developing world is, or soon will be, "post-transitional". Unfortunately, in spite of a great deal of research over many decades, the determinants of post-transitional fertility are far from being well understood. Moreover, the existing literature on both the causes and the implications of very low fertility is overwhelmingly concerned with developed countries, especially Europe. This leaves us facing several fundamental and unanswered questions. How far will fertility fall in the developing world? What can the countries now entering the era of low fertility learn from the experience of Europe, East Asia, and other well established regions of low fertility? How will individuals, families, societies and governments in the developing world adapt to this new fertility regime? These questions have scarcely been posed to date, and never investigated in depth; they set a new research agenda for fertility studies.
Conclusion -A "main sequence" of demographic transition
A famous graph in astronomy, the Hertzsprung-Russell Diagram, plots the colour or spectrum of a star against its magnitude or luminosity. Most stars fall along a diagonal line that is known as the "main sequence", but some types of star (red giants, white dwarves etc.) occupy positions away from the main diagonal. Inspired by this diagram, Figure 4 presents the paths followed over time by the five world regions used to decompose mortality trends; total fertility is plotted on the horizontal (with a reversed scale) and life expectancy on the vertical. has a distinctly different time track, with an abrupt initial rise in life expectancy (the effects of the Great Leap Forward famine are somewhat masked because it falls into two quinquennia), followed by its exceptionally rapid fertility decline. Figure 5 is a particularly striking finding. The regions are highly diverse in culture and in the level of socio-economic development; they also differ in the date at which fertility transition began and in the tempo of their transitions, yet they follow very similar trajectories. This finding suggests that the health and fertility transitions are more tightly connected than is often appreciated.
This paper has painted the global demographic scene with the very broadest of brushes; consideration of smaller units of aggregations yields a more nuanced picture of change. Yet there is value in reminding ourselves of the powerful similarities that exist in the demographic transition (Dyson 2010) . The overwhelming majority of humanity is engaged in a process of demographic convergence. There is good reason to view the fertility transition as a truly global process, with no evidence of significant reversals and only a few countries still to embark upon it. Within a decade or so, we can expect fertility for the large majority of the world's population to be post-transitional. In contrast, the health transition is a slower transformation and there is disturbing evidence of its fragility, with stagnation and reversals affecting hundreds of millions of people.
Appendix 1 -Data organisation
All data used in this paper are taken from the United Nations' World Population Prospects -2008 Revision (United Nations 2009). However, the groupings of countries used in the paper differ in some cases from those used by the United Nations. The five groups used here in the analysis of mortality are defined as follows:
USSR and Post-Soviet States: Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (from South-Central Asia); Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (from West Asia); Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (from Europe).
Southern Africa: In addition to Southern Africa as defined by the UN, I include Zimbabwe.
East, Middle and West Africa:
The same as the UN's definition except for Zimbabwe which is moved from East to Southern Africa.
Other Developed: The UN's "More Developed" category minus the European members of the USSR and Post-Soviet States.
Other Developing: The UN's "Less Developed" category minus East, Middle, Southern and West Africa, and minus the Asian members of the USSR and Post-Soviet States.
For the analysis of fertility, the USSR and Post-Soviet States are included in the Developed category, and Southern Africa is included with the Other Developing grouping. Table A1 .1 gives the population in each of the five regions used here from 1950 to 2010, while Table A1 .2 presents the same information as percentages of the global total. The life expectancy and total fertility rates presented for each region in the paper are weighted averages, using the mid-interval population of each country in the region as the weights. 
